The Journal of Military History 68.4 (2004) 1143-1186
Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology: A Strategic Study of Operation Detachment.
By Robert S. Burrell.
On 4 March 1945, fourteen costly days after Marines invaded Iwo Jima, a B-29 Superfortress ran short on fuel and asked permission to land on the island's ill-prepared airfield. One Marine combat correspondent explained what went through his mind as the B-29 landed:
Like a giant bird, it set down on Motoyama Airfield Number One. The B-29 landed on hallowed ground, volcanic ash surfaced with hard clay which recently had soaked in the blood of American Marines. . . . These Leathernecks from your and my hometowns made it possible for the B-29 to land here. Now, those lads are buried in the shadow of Mount Suribachi, where Old Glory flies from the crest, proclaiming to all that American Marines conquered the Japs who held the formidable volcano fortress.
In the first days of the battle, men argued over whether the island would have any "lasting military significance," but the appearance of the B-29 quelled all that. The euphoria of this initial event had an immediate impact on the high commands of the Army Air Forces, Navy, and Marine Corps. The media also quickly publicized the succession of B-29 landings, helping to create the myths that followed. The struggle for the island had achieved heroic proportions after the famous photograph of Marines raising the second flag on Mount Suribachi; consequently, romanticism drove the effort to justify the costs of the battle.
Almost every book, journal, and website that addresses the battle justifies the deaths of nearly 7,000 Americans at Iwo Jima with the "emergency landing theory." Essentially, the theory argues that 2,251 B-29 Superfortresses landed on Iwo Jima; each Superfort carried 11 crewmen; and accordingly, the capture of Iwo Jima saved the lives of 24,761 Americans. However, the emergency landing theory is largely myth. Just as scholars used it to solidify the case for the necessity of capturing Iwo Jima, the claim demonstrates the extent to which the battle has been misunderstood.
History has forgotten that not all Pacific War veterans agreed with the need for the battle. For example, during an interview concerning naval operations on Saipan, retired Admiral Charles S. Adair, a Navy captain in 1945 and a senior amphibious operations planner with the Pacific's Seventh Fleet, reflected about Iwo Jima: "I don't think Iwo Jima should have been taken, because of the cost to take it. And I don't think the value was there. I don't think it was needed, and if every plane that landed on Iwo Jima, that had to critically, were added up, and the pilots were added up, I'll bet they wouldn't anywhere near total 25,000." In current accounts of Iwo Jima, criticism like Adair's can no longer be heard. Over the years the legends of Iwo Jima have become America's reality.
A look into the planning for Iwo Jima demonstrates that the service rivalry resulting from the dual advances of the Navy and the Army in the Pacific negatively influenced the decision to initiate Operation Detachment (the code name for the Iwo Jima plan). The Navy, rather than waiting for the Army to complete its seizure of the Philippines in 1944 and release the ground forces needed to invade Formosa, made a hasty change in plans between 29 September and 2 October and decided to seize Okinawa instead, thereby continuing its advance without delay. Although Okinawa satisfied the Navy's purposes, the simultaneous proposal to seize Iwo Jima actually derived from the strategy of the Army Air Forces, which wanted to improve the strategic air campaign against Japan by providing fighter support from Iwo Jima for the B-29 Superfortresses based in the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian, and Guam). The combined objectives of Okinawa and Iwo Jima ensured approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This alliance between the Navy, which was seeking to outflank the Army, and the Army Air Forces, which wanted to prove the case for strategic bombing in order to create an independent postwar service, satisfied each of their respective interests. However, the Marine Corps, which paid the heaviest price for carrying out Operation Detachment, remained excluded from the decision-making process. When fighter escort operations from Iwo Jima failed, the military sought additional reasons to justify the costly battle. Over the past sixty years historians have perpetuated these illusions ...
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