REVIEW: John Lukacs, June 1941: Hitler and Stalin.

H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by H-War@h-net.msu.edu (September 2006)

John Lukacs. _June 1941: Hitler and Stalin_. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006. xii + 169 pp. Appendix, bibliography, index. $25.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-300-11437-0.

Reviewed for H-War by Geoffrey P. Megargee, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

Lukacs's War

In his latest work, John Lukacs revisits the story of what was, without a doubt, one of the greatest confrontations of all time.  Readers of this list with any interest in the era will have heard, many times by now, that if Hitler had not attacked the Soviet Union, or if the USSR had gone down in defeat, the history of the Second World War would have been very different.  For that reason alone, an understanding of the conflict's origins is essential.  How can one explain the outbreak of such an important conflict?

For Lukacs, the answer is clear:  everything depended upon Hitler and Stalin. This is unabashed "great man" history, and this reviewer would be the last to argue that Lukacs's approach has no merit, especially in this case.  The problem is that he has not executed it well.  His writing is engaging and lively (if pedantic at times), the story is fascinating, and there is no shortage of thought-provoking material, but in the end the book is not nearly so useful as it could have been ...

Comments

[Ali]

Sounds potentially interesting, and it might help to shed more light on the question as to why the USSR was so seemingly unprepared for the Nazi invasion in June 1941, leading to such catastrophic results. What I am most interested in is whether a new source base has been used that was previously unavailable. There was a rash of 'revelations' surrounding 1941, but little has appeared since. Maybe this will plug the gap?

[Alan Allport]

The review suggests that the source base is problematic:

"Lukacs has a tendency to write with great confidence about leaders' thinking, but his use of the evidence is frequently open to criticism. He states, for instance, that Hitler was not pleased with the Soviet invasion of Finland in November 1939, but that he "gave no public or even private expressions of his displeasure" (p. 25) ... The book's use of secondary sources is puzzling. Lukacs has had a long and fruitful career, with over twenty-five books to his credit. Surely he is aware of the many works that touch on this subject. However, in his list of the "documents, books, and articles that I consulted during the writing of this book," the gaps are huge (p. 160). Where are Gerhard Weinberg, Christopher Browning, or Peter Longerich? Where are Williamson Murray, Adam Ulam, or Ian Kershaw? Where is the excellent series from the Military History Research Institute in Potsdam? Mention of these and many other works would have, at the very least, given the general reader places to go for more information and alternative interpretations, while demonstrating to the scholar that Lukacs had done his homework."